نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دکتری علوم اقتصادی، دانشگاه مازندران، بابلسر، ایران
2 دانشیار گروه اقتصاد، دانشگاه مازندران، بابلسر، ایران
چکیده
در این مقاله به منظور بررسی تاثیر عوامل بیرونی بر اعتبار بانک مرکزی و ارزیابی ارتباط بین اعتبار بانک مرکزی و نرخ بهره از شاخص زیان اعتباری استفاده می‌شود. از آنجا که بانک‌های مرکزی در کشورهای در حال توسعه عملکرد مناسبی در راستای هدایت تورم به سمت اهداف اعلان شده نداشته‌اند، ارزیابی اثر اعتبار بانک مرکزی بر متغیرهای اقتصاد کلان و واکاوی عوامل بیرونی اثرگذار بر اعتبار ضروری به نظر می‌رسد. بنابراین، در این مقاله تلاش می‌شود عوامل مالی و نهادی تاثیرگذار بر اعتبار بانک مرکزی تجزیه و تحلیل و با استفاده از شاخص گذشته‌نگر زیان اعتبار که عملکرد بانک مرکزی را مبنای کسب اعتبار معرفی می‌کند، اثر درون‌زای اعتبار بانک مرکزی بر نرخ بهره برای 17 کشور درحال توسعه در طی سال‌های 2019-1996 مورد ارزیابی قرار گیرد. نتیجه به دست آمده حاکی از برقراری اثر مثبت و معنی‌دار شاخص زیان اعتبار بانک مرکزی بر نرخ بهره با در نظر گرفتن درون‌زایی اعتبار است. از آنجا که عملکرد بانک مرکزی، خود تابعی از عوامل بیرونی همچون مالی و نهادی است، افزایش سطح استقلال بانک مرکزی، اجرای کامل و قانونی قواعد مالی در کنار پذیرش رسمی هدف‌گذاری تورم نه تنها با محدود کردن رفتار دولت‌ها و ایجاد انضباط مالی عملکرد بانک مرکزی را بهبود می‌بخشد، بلکه کارگزاران اقتصادی را نیز متقاعد می‌کند که دولت‌ها و بانک‌های مرکزی متعهد به وعده‌های اعلام شده هستند.
کلیدواژه‌ها
موضوعات
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