نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسنده

استادیار، گروه بانکداری، پژوهشکده پولی و بانکی بانک مرکزی، تهران، ایران

10.22054/ijer.2020.53953.891

چکیده

از آنجا که مساله کژمنشی در رفتارهای نظام بانکی کارایی نظام تامین مالی کشور را دچار مخاطره می‌کند، وجود شواهد نظری و تجربی این پدیده در نظام بانکی ایران راهگشای سیاست‌گذاران خواهد بود. رفتارهای پرخطر بانک‌ها می‌تواند ناشی از مشکلات اطلاعات نامتقارن بین بانک مرکزی و شبکه بانکی باشد. این مطالعه با استفاده از اثرات همزمان میان تغییر ریسک و تغییر اهرم بانکی در شبکه بانکی به دنبال شواهد وجود کژمنشی در شبکه بانکی ایران است. برای این منظور از داده‌های تابلویی پویای نظام بانکی در سال‌های ۱۳۸۵ تا ۱۳۹۸ استفاده شده است. مطابق با نتایج به‌دست آمده، هر تغییر ریسک با سطح اهرم بانکی در ارتباط بوده و مطابق با نتایج، ارتباط مثبت و معنی‌دار میان سطح ریسک و اهرم بانکی برقرار است. این رابطه دلیلی برای وجود کژمنشی در شبکه بانکی کشور است که می‌تواند دلیلی بر نوعی شکست بانک مرکزی در نظارت و حمایت از نظام بانکی نیز باشد.  

کلیدواژه‌ها

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