Document Type : Research Paper

Author

• jalal molabeigi

PhD in Economics, Assistant professor of department economics ayatollah brojerdi University

Abstract

An important feature in market design is the stability of allocations since the created allocations, even if duly formed, may collapse when they are not stable. In other words, when suppliers and demanders meet via a mechanism that is not stable, some elements may egress the mechanism. Therefore, stability is the key issue in matching agents. Stable allocation is a situation whereby no coalition can cleaves to improve the member conditions. Kidney market is such a market that needs to be revived by designers. In the present study, the data are collected from 20 dialysis patients and 20 kidney donors to study stable allocations. Shapely value approach is used to examine stable allocations. The results showed that collaborations among patients led to the creation of two three-way coalitions worth 930 and 880 M IRR, two two-way coalitions worth 610 and 530 M IRR, and one chain coalition worth 660 M IRR. Since the shapely value obtained from patient collaborations is stable, all coalitions of the present study enjoy stability feature. The results reveal that market design in kidney exchange increases the number of efficient transplants from 4 to 17 pairs in the research sample. Besides, the patient and donors with the same blood types may not need to participate in the mechanism.

Keywords

• Cooperative Game
• Market Design
• Shapley Value
• Stable Allocation
• Kidney Exchange