Public sector economics
Ahmadreza Ahmadi; Ghahreman Abdoli; Fatemeh Azhari
Abstract
The present study examines the impact of globalization on Iran’s underground economy over the period 1979–2020. In this regard, the size of the underground economy was estimated using the MIMIC method. Subsequently, the effects of the three main dimensions of globalization—economic, ...
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The present study examines the impact of globalization on Iran’s underground economy over the period 1979–2020. In this regard, the size of the underground economy was estimated using the MIMIC method. Subsequently, the effects of the three main dimensions of globalization—economic, social, and political—as well as the dual components of each dimension (de facto and de jure), were analyzed using the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach. The findings from the long-run estimations indicate that the economic and social dimensions of globalization have a negative effect on the underground economy, whereas the political dimension exerts a positive effect. Further analysis of the components of each globalization dimension reveals that both the de facto and de jure components of social globalization negatively influence the underground economy. Although the de jure component of economic globalization also has a negative impact, its de facto component does not have a significant effect. Regarding the political dimension, de facto component has a significant positive effect on the underground economy, while the de jure component does not show a meaningful impact. Additionally, the results demonstrate that, in all four estimated models, unemployment has a positive effect and financial deepening has a negative effect on the underground economy. These findings offer useful guidance for policymakers aiming to reduce the size of the underground economy and enhance economic transparency in the country.
Amir Jafarzadeh; Ghahreman Abdoli; Afshin Javan
Abstract
European countries need to diversify their natural gas imports to reduce their dependency on Russia. One of the best options for exporting natural gas to European countries is to export gas through the Southern Corridor, in which Iran, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Iraq could potentially be major participants. ...
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European countries need to diversify their natural gas imports to reduce their dependency on Russia. One of the best options for exporting natural gas to European countries is to export gas through the Southern Corridor, in which Iran, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Iraq could potentially be major participants. All four countries need Turkey to export natural gas; there is no alternative way in this regard. In the present paper, the bargaining power of different countries and possible alliances for natural gas exports to Europe are studied, based on the cooperative game theory approach, especifically Shapley Value solution. Accordingly, we identify various possible scenarios as possible options. Our approach helps us know different countries' bargaining power for exporting natural gas to Europe, which is a useful approach in this field.
Amir Jafarzadeh; Abbas Shakeri; Farshad Momeni; Ghahraman Abdoli
Volume 19, Issue 61 , February 2015, , Pages 1-29
Abstract
The following paper investigates European policy about importing natural gas from Caspian Sea countries. The Nabucoo and Trans-Caspian gas project are the two potential projects. For these pipelines three countries are candidates: Iran, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. By using the game theory framework, ...
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The following paper investigates European policy about importing natural gas from Caspian Sea countries. The Nabucoo and Trans-Caspian gas project are the two potential projects. For these pipelines three countries are candidates: Iran, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. By using the game theory framework, coalition among natural gas exporters for the Nabucco Project has been considered. Iran, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan are three potential exporter countries. In this paper we answer the question whether three countries should enter the coalition for exporting gas to Europe or not. Moreover, we accounted bargaining power of these countries. We conclude that all countries have profits to make the coalition for gas exporting in the Nabucoo project. Iran has more bargaining power than others so Iran can play an important and active role for exporting gas to Europe in the Nabucco project.
Ghahreman Abdoli; Ali Khirandish
Volume 14, Issue 43 , July 2010, , Pages 111-140
Abstract
Many governments and private projects are done by contractor. They get projects in a competitive bid auction environment. A contractor in order to overcome to other competitors in a bid auction, opportunely cuts down biding price(bids project at or below minimum profit level) and wins the contract, and ...
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Many governments and private projects are done by contractor. They get projects in a competitive bid auction environment. A contractor in order to overcome to other competitors in a bid auction, opportunely cuts down biding price(bids project at or below minimum profit level) and wins the contract, and hopes to recover the loss (or less profit) from this action ,through negotiations or claims. Based on a dynamic game theory model, the opportunistic winner would request a compensation for the damage incurred by the party after the contract start. After a claim filed, the owner offers to negotiate with the builder. Nash equilibrium solution of this model is negotiating and settling, not going to court. Appling Rubinstein (1982) bargaining theorem the possible range of negotiation settlement is obtained. The lower bound of this range is minimum gain of builder from claim and maximum bound is maximum loss of owner in claim. In the application case, the opportunely and the claim amount are obtained between the ranges implied by the theoretical model
