Political economy
Farshad Moameni; hojjatollah mirzaei; ali jafari shahrestani
Abstract
Before 1990th, in political economy theories, the security of property rights was to be presumed. The importance of property rights as the underlying factor of economic growth and economic development was first noticed by new institutional economists and then expanded. This paper studied the Marxist ...
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Before 1990th, in political economy theories, the security of property rights was to be presumed. The importance of property rights as the underlying factor of economic growth and economic development was first noticed by new institutional economists and then expanded. This paper studied the Marxist and methodological individualism political economy approaches that have been used by researchers to describe the main reasons for the underdevelopment of Iran with a focus on property rights.The weakness of them all is inadvertence to Iranian historical features and failure to present an independent theory regarding the inefficiency of property rights in the history of Iran. Therefore, using the new institutional approach, which is based on historical studies and society institutions and using them in the analysis of the role of property rights on underdevelopment and not just studying the series of historical developments and geographical features, could be a facilitator. In this way, this paper suggests focusing on these features of Iran:1) Specific climatic conditions of Iran with the lack of water, which is the main reason for tension;2) The effect of climate conditions on political and economical systems (the government theory) and forming nomadism and tribal life and tribal governments;3) The effect of forming those political and economical system on property rights underdevelopment (the property rights theory).
Political economy
Alireza Raanaei; rouhollah shahnazi; Seyyed Aqil Hoseiny
Abstract
The history of modern Iran is full of movements and revolutions. The primary goal of these events has been to achieve a proper balance between the government and society. Although the efforts of Iranians in their modern history have not been fruitless, they have yet to reach the ideal balance between ...
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The history of modern Iran is full of movements and revolutions. The primary goal of these events has been to achieve a proper balance between the government and society. Although the efforts of Iranians in their modern history have not been fruitless, they have yet to reach the ideal balance between the government and society. The present research, through a brief narration of modern history, examines the pathways of progress for the Iranian government and society. To this end, an institutional analysis framework is expanded, and by employing the idea of institutional congruity, a new analytical framework is constructed to analyze the interaction between society and government in Iran. Subsequently, using game theory within this framework, various scenarios of this interaction are examined. The research findings indicate that depreciation, economies of scale, and the instability of preferences are important factors in the dynamics related to the interaction between government and society. Nevertheless, the rate of time preference is the more determining factor, to an extent that determines three possible equilibriums: democracy, despotic Leviathan, and absent Leviathan.
Political economy
Abolfazl Shahmohammadi; Mohammad Ali Feizpour; Mehdi Hajamini; Mohammad Abedi Ardakani
Abstract
Many studies have evaluated political power from a qualitative and quantitative perspective. But the present study tries to provide a quantitative criterion for calculation of power. To do this, using the country’s budget law, the institutions that enjoys from national budget are identified and ...
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Many studies have evaluated political power from a qualitative and quantitative perspective. But the present study tries to provide a quantitative criterion for calculation of power. To do this, using the country’s budget law, the institutions that enjoys from national budget are identified and then the officials who are at the head of those institutions from each province are identified. Then the importance coefficient of each official is calculated based on multiplication of two indicators: the allocated budget to his/her institution or organization and the duration of his/her tenure in each year. The power matrix for each province is made. Finally, the power index for Iranian provinces is calculated using methods of Simple Additive Weighting, TOPSIS, and Numerical Taxonomy. Then, according to TOPSIS method, the regions of Iran were divided into four groups. The findings show fundamental inequalities in the distribution of economic- political power in the regions of Iran during the period of 2009-2019. Also, The most fluctuations in economic-political power index have occured mainly in the middle groups. Since, most previous studies have emphasized regional inequalities in Iran based on various indicators, it seems that there is a correlation between the distribution of economic-political power and regional inequalities of Economic development. As a result, given the current status without change in the political power of the provinces, one can not expect a significant change in the economic development of the regions.
Jafar Kheirkhahan; Hamid Reza Baradaran Shoraka
Volume 5, Issue 16 , October 2003, , Pages 101-132
Abstract
The low rate of economic growth in resource-abundant countries remains as a paradox for economists and socio-political scientists. There have been various explanations for this phenomena.One of the latest explanations considers the under-development of legal institutions as the major factor، which is ...
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The low rate of economic growth in resource-abundant countries remains as a paradox for economists and socio-political scientists. There have been various explanations for this phenomena.One of the latest explanations considers the under-development of legal institutions as the major factor، which is indicated by non-cooperative and rent seeking behavior of the interest groups، leading to serious economic difficulties.This paper examines the case of oil boom in the context of modern approaches of political economy. The saving rate reaction is explained within the conflicting positions of interest groups in an oil exporting economy. The "Varacity Effect" is introduced and examined، indicating a counter cyclical behavior for the saving rate in a developing economy، where the rise in aggregate consumption may exceed the effects of resource boom.An econometric analysis of oil exporting economies indicates the experience of varacity effect in all OPEC members after the oil boom.In conclusion، it is argued that initiation of certain institutional reforms are crucial for improving the savings behavior and overall performance of resource-based economies.
