Energy Economy
Davood Daneshjafari; Mohammadmahdi Hajian; Javad Jafarzadeh
Abstract
In long-term gas contracts, there is usually a risk for the seller that the buyer will refuse to take delivery. For this reason, the condition of obligation to take or pay in such contracts has become common. Commitment condition is a condition that obliges the buyer in the gas sales contract to pay ...
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In long-term gas contracts, there is usually a risk for the seller that the buyer will refuse to take delivery. For this reason, the condition of obligation to take or pay in such contracts has become common. Commitment condition is a condition that obliges the buyer in the gas sales contract to pay the seller a part of the contract price, which is determined as a percentage of the total amount, even if he does not receive the agreed gas volume. The research question is whether this condition has economic efficiency? Will a long-term balance between buyer and seller be an option for this condition in the contract or not? To answer these question, first, with the concept of evolutionary game theory, we have shown a picture of contracts before the existence of this condition and after its formation. Then, by setting the normal form of the game and using Python software, we have repeated this game thousand times, the results show that accepting the condition of commitment to take or pay will be stable evolutionary equilibrium. From this perspective, the inclusion of such a condition in the contract creates economic efficiency, and the policy recommendation in this regard would be for policy makers to prefer a lower definite income to a higher probable income by including such a condition.
Amir Jafarzadeh; Abbas Shakeri; Farshad Momeni; Ghahraman Abdoli
Volume 19, Issue 61 , February 2015, , Pages 1-29
Abstract
The following paper investigates European policy about importing natural gas from Caspian Sea countries. The Nabucoo and Trans-Caspian gas project are the two potential projects. For these pipelines three countries are candidates: Iran, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. By using the game theory framework, ...
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The following paper investigates European policy about importing natural gas from Caspian Sea countries. The Nabucoo and Trans-Caspian gas project are the two potential projects. For these pipelines three countries are candidates: Iran, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. By using the game theory framework, coalition among natural gas exporters for the Nabucco Project has been considered. Iran, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan are three potential exporter countries. In this paper we answer the question whether three countries should enter the coalition for exporting gas to Europe or not. Moreover, we accounted bargaining power of these countries. We conclude that all countries have profits to make the coalition for gas exporting in the Nabucoo project. Iran has more bargaining power than others so Iran can play an important and active role for exporting gas to Europe in the Nabucco project.
Ghahreman Abdoli; Ali Khirandish
Volume 14, Issue 43 , July 2010, , Pages 111-140
Abstract
Many governments and private projects are done by contractor. They get projects in a competitive bid auction environment. A contractor in order to overcome to other competitors in a bid auction, opportunely cuts down biding price(bids project at or below minimum profit level) and wins the contract, and ...
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Many governments and private projects are done by contractor. They get projects in a competitive bid auction environment. A contractor in order to overcome to other competitors in a bid auction, opportunely cuts down biding price(bids project at or below minimum profit level) and wins the contract, and hopes to recover the loss (or less profit) from this action ,through negotiations or claims. Based on a dynamic game theory model, the opportunistic winner would request a compensation for the damage incurred by the party after the contract start. After a claim filed, the owner offers to negotiate with the builder. Nash equilibrium solution of this model is negotiating and settling, not going to court. Appling Rubinstein (1982) bargaining theorem the possible range of negotiation settlement is obtained. The lower bound of this range is minimum gain of builder from claim and maximum bound is maximum loss of owner in claim. In the application case, the opportunely and the claim amount are obtained between the ranges implied by the theoretical model
Rahim Goodarzi; Masode Homaionyfar
Volume 10, Issue 34 , April 2008, , Pages 125-144
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is twofold. The first aim is to illustrate the relationship between game theory and linear programming. The other aim is to apply game theory to field crops. We have used the main field crops (wheat, barley, paddy, maize, chickpea, lentil ,cotton and potato) in Province of Fars. ...
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The purpose of this paper is twofold. The first aim is to illustrate the relationship between game theory and linear programming. The other aim is to apply game theory to field crops. We have used the main field crops (wheat, barley, paddy, maize, chickpea, lentil ,cotton and potato) in Province of Fars. The data included time series of gross product values of the investigated crops for the period 1362-1382. The Wald decision-making criterion was applied to the game theory model to determine the highest income under the worst conditions. The results of the model indicate that potato and paddy were the most risky crops for the the period of study. As potato and paddy provide the highest expected income under the worst conditions these crops enter the optimum plan. Furthermore, these two crops have the highest variation coefficients compared to the other crops. It is concluded that the game theory model can be used to select alternative management strategies.
