Energy Economy
Davood Daneshjafari; Mohammadmahdi Hajian; Javad Jafarzadeh
Abstract
In long-term gas contracts, there is usually a risk for the seller that the buyer will refuse to take delivery. For this reason, the condition of obligation to take or pay in such contracts has become common. Commitment condition is a condition that obliges the buyer in the gas sales contract to pay ...
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In long-term gas contracts, there is usually a risk for the seller that the buyer will refuse to take delivery. For this reason, the condition of obligation to take or pay in such contracts has become common. Commitment condition is a condition that obliges the buyer in the gas sales contract to pay the seller a part of the contract price, which is determined as a percentage of the total amount, even if he does not receive the agreed gas volume. The research question is whether this condition has economic efficiency? Will a long-term balance between buyer and seller be an option for this condition in the contract or not? To answer these question, first, with the concept of evolutionary game theory, we have shown a picture of contracts before the existence of this condition and after its formation. Then, by setting the normal form of the game and using Python software, we have repeated this game thousand times, the results show that accepting the condition of commitment to take or pay will be stable evolutionary equilibrium. From this perspective, the inclusion of such a condition in the contract creates economic efficiency, and the policy recommendation in this regard would be for policy makers to prefer a lower definite income to a higher probable income by including such a condition.
Mehdi Sadeghi; Seyyed Rohollah Ahmadi
Volume 17, Issue 51 , July 2012, , Pages 89-112
Abstract
Policy-makers around the world have emphasized the virtues of deregulation. The banking industry in Iran has partly experienced reform after the domestic peivate banks entry since 2000. This study investigates the impact of this policy on economic efficiency of banking sector by using banking data over ...
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Policy-makers around the world have emphasized the virtues of deregulation. The banking industry in Iran has partly experienced reform after the domestic peivate banks entry since 2000. This study investigates the impact of this policy on economic efficiency of banking sector by using banking data over the period 1997-2006. We measured the economic efficiency of banks using SDEA which necessitated a grasp of technical and allocation efficiency and calculated the model by GAMS software. The purpose of stochastic setting of DEA is accommodating both the inefficiency and the presence of measurement errors. In the second step we used the fixed effect model on panel data to regress efficiency measures on policy variable of entry. We solved the regression model by Eviews and Stata softwares. Our result show that entry variable has not meaningful effect on efficiency. So economic efficiency cannot be differentiated on the basis of policy reform of entry.
Volume 5, Issue 14 , April 2003, , Pages 83-112
Abstract
There is a tension between energy efficiency of the State Owned Enterprise (SOE) sector versus the economic efficiency of the Township and Village Enterprise (TVE) Sector in China. Research has shown that the cokemaking sector in Shanxi Province exhibits contradictory features of having greater overall ...
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There is a tension between energy efficiency of the State Owned Enterprise (SOE) sector versus the economic efficiency of the Township and Village Enterprise (TVE) Sector in China. Research has shown that the cokemaking sector in Shanxi Province exhibits contradictory features of having greater overall factor productivity than the SOE cokemaking sector, while at the same time being less energy efficient. In my current research I have shown that this is not a unique feature of the TVE cokemaking sector in Shanxi Province, but that the same paradoxical behavior is exhibited by an overwhelming majority of industrial and service sectors, in addition to the agricultural sector, in Shanxi Province and China as a whole.Virtually, all productivity studies of state-owned and township and village enterprises in China during the 1980s and 1990s concluded that the growth of productivity in the TVE sector has outpaced that of the NTVE sector. In this paper, I show some of the reasons behind the economic efficiency of the TVE sector as compared to the NTVE sector, despite the fact that my analysis also shows that they are less energy efficient. Using Structural Decomposition Analysis, I show that 28 out of 29 TVE sectors in China are less energy efficient than their NTVE counterparts. This, despite the fact that TVEs in China have enjoyed far better economic performance than NTVEs, particularly SOEs, with among other things total factor productivity being three times as great as that of NTVEs. In order to reconcile this paradox, I examine the direct and indirect labor inputs between the TVE and NTVE sectors in China. It is apparent from the analysis that TVEs direct and indirect labor inputs are much lower than that of NTVEs, which offsets the differences in direct and indirect energy inputs. In order to explain the above differences in economic, energy and labor productivity between TVEs and NTVEs, I have extended previous studies on institutional theories of property and ownership, showing the contribution of many institutional factors to TVEs economic performance. Among the most important of these factors are financing of investment, security of property rights, transaction costs, urban proximity, collective heritage, government revenue, non-farm employment, and per capita income. In this paper, I examine the paradox in the energy and economic efficiencies between China's Township and Village Enterprise (TVEs) and Non-TVE (NTVEs), the majority of which are State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Many analysts (e.g. Jefferson 1999, Steinfeld 1998, Lardy 1997, Liew 1997, Fewsmith 1994) have tried to explain the superior economic efficiency of TVEs and their rapid growth since the beginning of the reform process, in 1979. These analysts laud the TVEs economic efficiency as an example of how the privatization process in China is making the entire economy more efficient; however, they overlook two important facts. First, TVEs are not mainly privately owned firms, and, second, even those that are, do not have the basic features of traditional private enterprises.At the same time, the success of TVEs has been used to criticize the supposedly bloated SOE sector, which constitutes the majority of industries in the NTVE sector and its inefficient and unproductive industries. Although SOEs may be economically inefficient, most analysts neglect to note that SOEs engage in many social functions other than profit maximization and improving productivity. The purpose here is to add another element into the debate between the SOE and TVE sectors, namely, although most TVEs are more economically efficient, SOEs are more energy efficient. I show that the primary reason behind this paradox is the fact that ambiguous property rights in the TVE sector allow these industries to establish informal relationships that often result in lower input and labor costs than in the NTVE sector.This paper is divided into three parts. In the first part, I give an overview of the differences between TVEs and NTVEs. In the second part, I examine the underlying energy and economic efficiency differences between TVEs and NTVEs by structural decomposition analysis. Finally, based on the results of the first two parts of this research, I give a theoretical basis for the observed paradox, focusing on the issues of property relations in the TVE sector.
